Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. This paper provides several recommendations to advance ISR for cyber defense. The Air Force should develop a robust ISR Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination (PED) capability devoted to cyberspace. Additionally, the Air Force should conduct an in-depth study to determine resources required for the National Air and Space Intelligence Center to grow capacity for more robust analysis of adversary cyber capabilities. Next, a stronger cyber defensive strategy, enabled by ISR, will require additional intelligence resources or realignment of existing resources in the Air Force ISR Agency and 24th Air Force. ISR capabilities will be the catalyst for cyber defense of critical assets to more fully protect commanders' air, space and cyber operations.
Introduction
A cyber attack perpetrated by nation states or violent extremist groups could be as destructive as the terrorist attack of 9/11. Such a destructive cyber terrorist attack could paralyze the nation. and other Joint and DOD Agencies. This structure evolved over time to support cyber activities not linked to the integrated Air Force Network (AFNET). As the AFNET becomes more mature, Air Force ISR activities, capabilities and analysis for defensive cyber operations should expand into a comprehensive cyber defense operations strategy to best stop and defeat the adversary.
Background
In the cyberspace domain, the art of defense is absolutely critical to ensuring freedom of operations. Starting at the nation state level, the defense of cyber networks is very important; intelligence plays a key role in this defense. According to Jeffrey Carr, "the core responsibility of intelligence as a discipline is to provide state leadership with insight into what the emerging threats are before they manifest into an attack on the state." 2 This view of the role of predictive intelligence should be applied to Air Force cyber defense, to proactively engage in defensive operations and strategies against threats to the Air Force's networks.
Within the realm of intelligence at the national-level and within the Department of Defense, "the primary function of joint intelligence is to provide information and assessments to 15 There are also threats in the realm of non-state cyber actors, ranging from Jihadist associated cyber actors with anti-US sentiments, all the way to political hacktivists. 16 As potential bad actors emerge on the Global Information Grid, Air Force cyber defense operations must be better postured through effective ISR to best provide full cyber mission assurance.
Current Air Force Cyber Defense Posture and ISR
Understanding of the current Air Force cyber defense posture and the ISR contribution to it is useful now that the cyber operational threat is established. Elements of the AFISRA are This squadron provides tailored support for the cyber defense mission, but is under-resourced from a personnel perspective for the mission it is tasked to perform. Unique to this capability is the small National-Tactical-Integration (NTI) capability for cyber intelligence within the 35 IS.
This activity is small scale and effective given current resources, but has untapped potential to provide broader, operationally effective ISR data for cyber defense. The operational focus tends to be on near-real-time operations, with little capability/capacity for adversary trend analysis for longer range threats. Additionally, the mission to perform analysis of the emerging threat from adversary malware is tasked to the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC)
Command Control Communications and Computers / Information Operations (C4/IO) Squadron.
According to Colonel Carl Brenner, the Commander of the NASIC Air & Cyber Analysis Group, the C4/IO Squadron has little capacity to perform long-range trend analysis of adversary cyber threats at the level of NASIC's well-established air and space intelligence support. 17 These Air
Force cyber intelligence units provide reporting which can be combined with reporting from joint, sister-service and national agencies.
Historically, Air Force network defense was based on a distributed architecture of intrusion detection systems known as ASIM (Automated Security Incident Management). This system provided evidence of adversary entrance and exit from the network, but was signature based and provided no capability for automatic blocking, tracking, forensics, or pattern of activity development. These systems were deployed at the base level, and provided a near-realtime but conceptually limited view of the cyber battlespace. Additionally, as adversary cyber tactics improved, ASIM provided ever more limited data for long-range trend analysis. The ASIM architecture contributed to the "defend everything" cyber strategy previously described, and had more limited intelligence interaction than might at first appear. This system was retired in 2011, and replaced with a series of more robust cyber defense systems to implement the strategy known as "Defense-In-Depth." According to a National Security Agency paper on Defense-in-Depth, the strategy works to "deploy protection mechanisms at multiple locations to resist all classes of attacks." 18 The 
Intelligence Processes
Air Force intelligence as a discipline has a very well defined intelligence cycle, which provides a framework of how data is gathered and analyzed to produce an operational intelligence product. The main parts of the Air Force intelligence cycle include planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination.
These five steps are well developed for ISR support to the air and space domains of warfare.
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Specified support for operations within the cyberspace domain for the intelligence cycle
is not yet well developed to be the trigger for large-scale, cyber defense strategies in the Air 
Optimizing Intelligence Processes for Cyber Defense
The traditional Air Force operations focus for cyber defense has tended to be centered on defense of the NIPRNET, with squadrons within the 67th Network Warfare Wing (67 NWW) and 688th Information Operations Wing (688 IOW) conducting many aspect of cyber defense.
Operational changes and new cyber defense technology within the last two years are pushing capabilities to ever higher levels. This offers the potential for Cyber ISR to drive new types of cyber defense strategies across the Air Force. consensus among the operational cyber leaders that were interviewed for this paper is that there will never be enough cyber defenses to go around. The units specified above support the cyber defense mission and have very minimally manned intelligence support activities to craft unitlevel operational defensive strategies. The squadrons are making the most of intelligence personnel associated with each mission set, but the organic assets are not sufficient. The existing manpower and associated resources are inadequate for increased cyber support. For reference, the intelligence flight within the 26 OSS, which supports the entire 67 NWW conducting global cyber operations, has four funded intelligence billets. 34 As can be seen from this example, the cyber intelligence personnel structure is very under resourced for its global mission.
Outside of existing Air Force cyber intelligence structures, the other services tend to depend heavily on National Security Agency (NSA) for analysis support. 35 Each of the other services has a capability for cyber intelligence, but is not well developed. As a previous operational user of cyber intelligence at Pacific Air Forces and 13th Air Force, Lieutenant
Colonel Jonathan Snowden backed up this picture. 36 Although a heavy dependence on NSA for intelligence for cyber defense may appear operationally sound, there is a potential to downplay service mission-specific requirements. Snowden further observed long-range cyber analysis focused on specific adversary intentions and capabilities was the focus of the operational Joint
Force Air Component Commander within the Pacific Region.
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Air Force intelligence units within AFISRA designated to support the defensive cyber mission should be recognized as existing "Centers of Excellence" which can be built upon as the operational imperative for Cyber ISR continues to grow. These established units focus on conducting Cyber ISR analysis based on near-real-time threats or broad general threats not necessarily specific to the Air Force. There is potentially a limited capability to conduct in-depth and long range analysis of specified cyber threats to Air Force missions and networks.
These activities would also benefit greatly from the increased use of data from Air Force cyber defense sensors, which has tremendous potential ISR value. Thus far this data is untapped due to the highly technical nature of the data, lack of analyst personnel resources, as well as data storage challenges. At this time, data storage is prohibitive due to the vast storage capacity requirements. 38 Furthermore, this data may go far to help fill critical vulnerabilities in the cyber intelligence cycle previously mentioned. Analysis efforts need to aim for a fully integrated cyber intelligence cycle, so it is no longer incomplete when compared to the air and space domains. 39 As technology continues to evolve, emphasis should be placed on development of processes to fully integrate data from cyber defense sensors into Air Force analysis activities for near-real-time and long-range cyber intelligence analysis. A sustainable PED structure for Cyber ISR should be developed to best support proactive Air Force Defensive Cyber Operations. 40 Fully developed ISR trend analysis will allow for predictive assessment to proactively posture cyber defensive strategies and operations to blunt adversary activities. 42 The feasibility of this program would be an excellent subject for a future Air War
College research paper.
Recommendations
Based on research and analysis of existing and future ISR within the Air Force to support defensive operations within the cyberspace domain, this paper recommends the following actions.
Develop a robust cyberspace ISR PED structure:
The Air Force should develop a robust ISR PED capability devoted to cyberspace. With the untapped ISR potential of data from Air Force cyber defense sensors, plus any future data from dedicated cyber ISR sensors, the potential operational contribution is invaluable. Given the incomplete development of the intelligence cycle to support Air Force cyber defense operations, there are existing frameworks within the Air Force which could be expanded. Requirements discussions are in a very early stage. PED capabilities for Cyber ISR are currently not well developed; normalized PED capabilities would drive more effective cyber intelligence reporting and operations.
Identify Resources:
A more detailed study should be conducted by Air Force experts to determine the suitability and associated additional resources required for NASIC to develop a robust capacity to conduct large scale all-source and long range adversary trend analysis of specified adversary cyber threats to Air Force missions and networks. As the Air Force's service intelligence center for established air and space systems, NASIC is uniquely situated for this cyber role. This perspective for NASIC was also echoed during the interview with Brigadier General Wooton.
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The author envisions this would require between one to three new squadrons to effectively perform this mission for the Air Force in the long term.
Focus cyber defense:
Cyber ISR resulting from the first two recommendations will provide the capacity to use ISR as the driver to shift cyber defense operations to focus on the highest priority systems only, where the adversary is forecast to most likely operate. This will result in greater cyber mission assurance for key Air Force capabilities/systems such as the F-22, F-35, remotely piloted aircraft, global mobility, special operations, logistics advanced technology and other weapons systems, as well as space and nuclear missions just to name a few.
Reinforce cyber defense resources:
AFISRA and 24th Air Force intelligence resources associated with the cyber defense mission for the Air Force should be greatly reinforced. As intelligence resources are freed up as the Afghanistan commitment gets smaller, a reallocation of intelligence analysis billets distributed among the associated units should be conducted. To do this effectively, a suitable manpower study should be implemented to determine the correct billet increases and associated certifications and training requirements. As ISR personnel resources are shifted from
Afghanistan associated support, a substantial amount of those analysts could be devoted to supporting Air Force cyber defense in the future. As the defense budget will continue to get smaller, these existing intelligence personnel resources could be used to better posture AFISRA and 24 AF units for cyber defense support.
Develop a Cyber Defended Asset List:
As Air Force ISR is evolved over time for better cyber defense of Air Force missions, intelligence can then be used to drive a Cyber Defended Asset List at the enterprise level. 44 Since there are never enough cyber defenses to go around, defense needs to focus on the most important missions. Based on operational inputs and the latest near-real-time and long range trend analysis, the concept of a dynamic cyber defended asset list should be fully developed within Air Force cyber operations.
Conclusion
The adoption of these recommendations will best posture the Air Force to defend its critical missions and networks in the future. As the speed and complexity of adversary capabilities within cyberspace continues to evolve, the Air Force must aggressively defend and preserve the Air Force's qualitative operations advantage, and therefore combat advantage.
Furthermore, a more evolved and robust ISR capability for cyber defense can be the impetus to to more fully protect commanders' air, space, and cyber operations.
